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Introduction
Military commanders like Alexander the Great or Richard the Lionheart did not
have to take public opinion greatly into account when they planned their campaigns in
their day. Today it is a very different situation.
In the light of the above this article starts with two somewhat startling quotes by the
futurologists Alvin and Heidi Toffler: "The people thinking hardest about warfare in the
future know that some of the most important combat of tomorrow will take place on the
media battlefield." They also state: "[TJhe media, including channels and technologies
unimagined today, will be a prime weapon for Third Wave combatants in both the wars
and anti-wars of the future, a key component of knowledge strategy.',2
In recent years, much has been made of the adversarial relations between journalists
and the military. The media have, for instance, been blamed for the US defeat in Vietnam,
for unthinkingly blabbing about tactical decisions in advance in the Falklands, etc. From
their side, journalists have been blaming the military for not trying to understand the
nature of their job, of covering up a number of bad things, etc.
It will probably have to be accepted that in modem, democratic countries there will
always be a structural tension between the media and the military - and, for that matter,
between the media and the whole government apparatus. All too frequently the media
wants to open up, to uncover scandals, while the government apparatus, of which the
military forms a part, wants publicity, but only on their terms. And then they get angry
when the media doesn't want to play their game.
The relationship between the military and the media therefore has to be explored:
are they allies or adversaries? This article shall firstly look at what the media and the
military are respectively, and what makes them tick in terms of communication,
propaganda and publicity. Thereafter a historical perspective will be given and the formal
situation in the old and the new South Africa will be analysed, and lastly a modus vivendi
whereby all role players should be able to live, will be explored.
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Alvin and Heidi Tomer: War and Anti-War, Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century (London,
(994), pp. 216 and 230.
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The media and the military
In terms of the role of the media in modem societies an important point needs to be
made from the outset. This is that the trend all over the world is towards greater openr;'2;SS,
more transparency and more communication. In fact, communication has prob.~bly
become one of the most important aspects of the modem world - so much so, that we can
speak of a communications revolution. This revolution has two important elements: one
involving people; the other regarding technology.
More or less until the sixties, the public in most democracies tended, by and large,
to trust those in authority, to accept their word, to believe what was written in black and
white, be it in newspapers or books and to accept as the truth what they saw on television.
During the latter part of the sixties, with its climax in 1968, a revolution took place. Trust
was elbowed out by distrust, uncritical acceptance was replaced by scepticism.
In growing measure, the public nowadays want those in leading positions to account
for what they did or did not do; they want their leaders to explain to them and to 'convince
them before they are willing to accept. In other words, communication - convincing
communication, to be exact - has become ever more important to politicians who are
dependent on a critical voters' corps for election or re-election. The average American,
Danish, Australian or South African voter of today is a much tougher proposition than
their ancestors of thirty plus years ago.
This is one of the reasons the floating vote has become much more important in
most democracies. A few decades ago people largely voted according to class, ethnicity
or tradition; today people to a far greater extent make either informed choices - or abstain
from voting at all.
The reasons for this change are complex, but this article will look at one very
important element, namely the technological revolution. The speed with which news and
analyses can be dispatched around the world started to accelerate drastically at the end of
the previous century because of the telegraph. When, for instance, an important battle
took place, people would read about it in the newspapers within hours, instead of the
weeks and months it previously took to inform people.
In the Vietnam War television was also introduced to the communication equation.
The visual qualities of this medium were extremely powerful, and it played an ever more
important role in defining the public's perceptions.
This process became faster and faster and today, in certain circumstances, real time
access to the developments on the battlefield are available - vide CNN and the Gulf War.
The Gulf War was, of course, a media war par excellence. One could see RAF Tornadoes
taking off and returning from their first bombing missions over Iraq and hear pilots giving
their first unedited, spontaneous views minutes after having been in action.
In a photo book about the Gulf War published by CNN, Thomas B. Allen, F.
Clifton Berry and Norman Polmar sum it all up: "Television coverage of the Persian Gulf
War changed the face of war. No longer can war be an event faraway in time and place.
Television made war immediate. That is part of the story of the Persian Gulf War.
Reporting on the war means reporting about television.,,3
Thomas B. Allen, F. Clifton Berry and Norman Palmar: War in the Gulf(London, 1992), p. 13.
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Being in the employ of CNN, the authors probably downplay the continued
influence of the print media. But they nevertheless make a valid statement, the point of
which is that dealing with the media and publicity in general has become an intrinsic part
of soldiers' work, in peacetime and in war. No officer can think about strategy or
operations any more without taking into account the media side. The fact that people are
able to communicate almost instantly with each other via E-mail and the Internet,
reinforces the point.
It also makes censorship much more difficult, and sometimes it will be downright
impossible. An American officer, Colonel Alan Campen, says that commercial
reconnaissance satellites will make it almost impossible for combatants to hide from the
media, and with all sides watching the video screen, instant broadcasts from the battle
zone threaten to alter the actual dynamics and strategies in war. It can, Campen says,
"transform reporters from dispassionate observers to unwitting, even unwilling, but
nonetheless direct participants" in a war.4
The point is, therefore, that people are to a greater or lesser extent informed better
and faster than at any time previously, and that they demand independent sources for
news-gathering and analysis of what it all means. This may vary from country to country;
one may accept that - say - the Americans or Germans have traveled much further down
this path than the Chinese or Congolese, but even in more authoritarian countries, the
trend is basically the same. The fact is thus that the media both reflect and influence
developments in society at large.
What modem audiences emphatically do not want, is one-sided propaganda, be it
from the government, political parties or whomever - including the media. In modem
societies there are enough newspapers and radio or television stations to switch to if you
do not like the way a certain medium reports about what is happening in the world.
Modem audiences are critical and want to be convinced, not fed with whatever somebody
somewhere decides they should be fed with ..
The reference is, therefore, to independent media, which refuses to take Big
Brother's line (and Big Brother may, of course, either be the government, big business or
some other powerful institution in society). The bottom line, in other words, is credibility.
The media have to be credible in their presentation and analysis of the news, otherwise
nobody would believe them either.
These two ideas, independence and credibility, are the bedrock of the discussion on
the role of the media in a modem free society. This is important to keep in mind when we
come to the relationship between the military and the media.
This is not to say that the media is untouchable, that they should not be accountable
themselves. If the media sees itself as society's guardian against corruption, misuse of
state authority, etc, who is guarding the guardian?
The media is run by journalists, and journalists are fallible people who make
mistakes. There are good, professional and conscientious journalists who do their utmost;
there are those who are only interested in sensation, who do not believe in having
something as trite as the truth come between themselves and a good story. There are also
journalists who try their best, but lack the expertise in a certain specialised field, such as
medicine, or the military, and whose reports or articles are therefore below standard.
Tomer: War and Anti-War, p. 226.
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This is, obviously, of ongoing concern to all conscientious journalists in leading
positions, who, therefore, try to rectify it. Being a newspaper editor, for example, to a
large extent demands quality control: a job that never ends. The problem might never be
solved, only ameliorated.
The military
In contrast to the media, the military can never be independent from government. If
that were the case, it would be a very alarming development. According to the Prussian
military thinker Carl von Clausewitz, war is essentially a political act: the grammar of war
and politics may differ, he says, but not the intrinsic logic according to which they
operate.s This means that the government of the day is in the driving seat; i~ is the
government who decides on policy, and it is the military who acts as a state instrument
and implements policy in its own particular field.
Being a soldier means constant training for war, something the population fervently
hopes will never materialise. This is the military's primary task. Their secondary task is to
help the government with the maintenance of law and order. A task which, in the case of
the SANDF, has become the primary focus in terms of exertion and time spent. Their
tertiary task is to make their collateral capabilities available for disaster relief.
The tension with the modem media comes in two fields. Firstly, governments in
general (and remember, the military forms part of the government structure) traditionally
want publicity, lots of it, but only on their terms. They prefer the media to act as an
uncritical trumpet of their successes; they prefer to be in the communications driving seat,
and they become very irritated when the media refuse to bow to this. This was the case in
the old South Africa and it is one of the things which hasn't changed all that much with
the new government.
Secondly, in wartime, the military wants to restrict and control the flow of
information about whatever is going on at the front, wherever that may be - in Lesotho or
on the Cape Flats. Obviously, any soldier would understandably be very angry if a
journalist would learn of, say, an attack or crime-prevention raid being planned for a
certain place and time, and then publishing it as a juicy scoop in the next morning's
edition, just in time for the enemy to learn about it and to take countermeasures.
A solution to this problem has to be found.
Media and military in history
Even in antiquity, kings used to take scribes along with them on campaigns in order
to record their mighty deeds. Sometimes their accounts were the only ones surviving for
modem historians to make sense out of; at other times separate accounts were discovered,
placing events in a whole new light.
Newspapers first became fashionable in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The first conflict to be extensively covered by independent newspapers, not as an
extension of the war effort, was the American civil war. During the Boer War, British
newspapers used to publish short telegrams by Lord Roberts or Lord Kitchener about
battles and skirmishes in South Africa. Several weeks afterwards, war correspondents'
accounts arriving by mail boat would then supplement the readers'understanding of what
Carl von Clausewitz: On War (Vom Kriegel, III/6, p. 125.
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actually happened in much greater detail. These accounts were, by and large, objective,
and are still very useful as sources by present-day historians.6
During the First World War, the speed of news transmitted to the home front
became even greater. In this case, too, the press in general started fairly objectively, but
were quickly bullied into submissiveness by their respective governments, who
subjugated them by force of legal censorship into becoming mere propaganda outlets for
the war effort. As British historian Niall Ferguson puts it: "Censorship probably did
achieve something; the very fact that journalists complained so much about it speaks in its
favour. It certainly kept a good deal secret ... The embarrassing loss of the battleship
Audacious (sic) off Ireland in October 1914 was not reported in Britain, nor was the
Battle of Jutland until some time after it was over. The Germans had no idea how serious
the French mutinies of 1917 were; probably few French civilians did either."
Nevertheless, Ferguson also comes to the conclusion (and here he supports the need for
credibility) that "much of the vilification of the enemy and mythologising of the casus
belli in which newspapers and other propagandists indulged was not seriously taken by
those who fought; the efficacy of propaganda was in inverse relation to proximity to the
Front. Only when based on the truth ... was propaganda effective in bolstering the will to
fight.,,7
By the start of World War II, the media was already an established presence on and
around the battlefield. War correspondents, from the daily press and the makers of movie
newsreels (the fore-runner of television), received army uniforms and were protected by
the military, who also censored their accounts through specially appointed and trained
censors.
In return, there was a tacit understanding that war correspondents would not give a
negative picture of their own side's conduct or shoot the correctness of either the Allied
or Axis war effort down. The war, right or wrong, was perceived by all sectors of society
on both sides as a battle for survival, of good against evil, and the task of the war
correspondent was to further that war effort, not make it more difficult by asking difficult
questions or exposing malpractices. Of course, the German and Japanese media, being
under strict state control, had no choice in the matter, while the Allied media theoretically
did, but this did not matter very much in practice.
The Vietnam War was a watershed. This was a war, as the American strategist
Harry G. Summers has noted, where the American government as a matter of policy did
not try to solicit the support of its voters for what it first saw as a sort of policing action,
and later because President Lyndon B. Johnson feared that kindling the passions of his
people could work against his social reform policy.8
In other words, no effort was made to explain to the American people - and this
included the media - why involvement in such a faraway war was vital or even important
to American interests. Coupled to this the war was fought without a serious, cohesive
understanding of the war aim. This filtered down to the media in Saigon, who were fed
patent and transparent lies during the 'five o'clock follies', as the daily press conference
at the US HQ in Saigon was derisively called by the journalists who were unfortunate
enough to be there.
Here I am, of course, drawing on my own experience as a military historian who has written about
the Anglo-Boer War and drawn on newspaper accounts as sources.
Niall Ferguson: The Pity of War (London, 1998), pp. 235 and 444.
Harry G. Summers: On Strategy II, a Critical Analysis'ofthe Gulf War (New York, 1992), p. 9.
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Without this concerted effort, the media soon started to question, firstly the way in
which the war was fought ("Either fight to win it, or get the hell out!"), and then the
morality of the war as such. In the process a lot of journalists wrote dispatches which
made the enemy in Hanoi very happy indeed. Because the war was fought in a totally
cock-eyed manner, the reporters were caught up in a growing vortex, a belief that it was
their task to 'expose' the immorality of the American involvement.
In later years, an American reporter, Robert Elegant, wrote that although the US and
South Vietnam forces won almost every encounter against the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese Army on the battlefield, "the War was finally lost to the invaders after the US
disengagement because the political pressures built up by the media had made it quite
impossible for Washington to maintain even the minimal material and moral support that
would have enabled the Saigon regime to continue effective resistance ... Despite their
own numerous and grave faults, the South Vietnamese were, first and last, decisively
defeated in Washington, New York, London and Paris. Those media defeats made
inevitable their subsequent defeat on the battlefield.,,9
As for the role of television, Dean Rusk, US foreign secretary in the Kennedy
administration, had this to say: "This was the first struggle fought on television in
everybody's living-room every day. What would have happened in World War II if
Guadalcanal and the Anzio beach-head and the Battle of the Bulge or the Dieppe raid
were on television and the other side was not doing the same thing? War is an obscene
blot on the face of the human race. But whether ordinary people, who prefer peace to war
in any country ... can sustain a war effort under that kind of daily hammering is a very
large question.,,10
It is generally assumed that the so-called Tet Offensive at the beginning of 1968
was the turning point of the Vietnam War. Although the offensive was militarily
decisively beaten back, and the Americans and South Vietnamese could boast of a great
victory in anybody's language, the media portrayed it as a defeat. The reasons are partly
because of reporters not well enough versed in military matters to make sense out of what
was admittedly a very chaotic series of events, but mainly because the US government
had maintained until then that the enemy was a spent force, that the US and South
Vietnamese Army were sitting on top of things. Here it was demonstrated, at any rate
during the first days of the offensive, that the enemy was not only very much alive and
full of fight, but that it was able to take the initiative in a very spectacular way. I I
There is another version. Harry G. Summers, for instance, does not doubt the role of
the media in influencing public opinion to the extent that the US government's political
room for maneuver was severely restricted. But, he says, the suspicion that the media was
responsible for the loss of the war "is a dumb notion. While the media is good at showing
the cost of war ... that cost only has meaning in relationship to the value of the war as
determined by the objectives set by the government."
"Not media portrayals of the cost of the war, but the government's failure to
establish those objectives, and hence fix the value of the war, was the primary cause for
the lack of public support. In fact, although television was to claim that they had brought
the horrors of war into the living room, post-war analysis of TV footage revealed that less
10
II
Quoted in Brian Bond: The Pursuit of Victory from Napoleon to Saddam Hussein (Oxford, 1996),
p.190.
Quoted in Michael Maclear: The Ten Thousand Day War (London, 1981), p. 296.
Cf. Keith William Nolan: The Balliefor Saigon. Tet 1968 (New York, 1996), pp. 257-258.
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than three percent - seventy-six of twenty-three hundred stories from 1965 to 1970 -
contained scenes of heavy combat with dead. or wounded shown on the screen.,,12
He also quotes the official US Army history of the war, which says: "Believing that
the press had in most cases supported official policies in earlier American wars,
especially World War II, many members of the military expected similar support in
Vietnam. When the contradictions engendered by President Johnson's strategy of limited
war led instead to a more critical attitude, the military tended increasingly to blame the
press for the credibility problems they experienced, accusing television news in particular
of turning the American public against the war.,,13 Note that the author primarily blames
Johnson, not so much the press - who did, nevertheless, playa very important role.
In the Falklands War, the British realised the importance of whipping up public
support for a war that was also very far away. They therefore took quite a lot of war
correspondents along with the naval task force, and gave them every technical assistance
to file their stories and articles.
In the beginning, the relations between the military and the media were decidedly
frosty. In his memoirs, Rear-Admiral Sandy Woodward, commander of the British task
force in the South Atlantic, relates how unsure he was dealing with "an unforeseen,
though probably unwitting enemy, the Press". The guidelines he received from London
for his dealings with the media, he says, could be summarized as "Co-operation, yes;
information, no."
This shows that he and his bosses quite clearly did not understand how to deal with
the media, and he proves the point by repeatedly castigating them (more often than not
unconvincingly) for misquoting him. He even goes as far as to say that "the Press did not
see itself as being on 'our' side at all. It saw itself as a fearless seeker after truth and I
believe they found a considerable amount of it. The Argentinean Generals and Admirals
admitted after the war that they gained ninety percent of all their intelligence about our
activities from the British Press. The BBC World Service was particularly helpful."
Unfortunately Admiral Woodward omits to analyse the kind of intelligence the
Argentineans purportedly gleaned from the media. If he had, he would probably have
found that it related mainly to general news reports about the advance of the task force,
the recapture of South Georgia, the air attacks on the Falklands, etc.
He then ameliorates his bias against the media by stating that "[w]e simply did not
understand each other and the blame lay fairly equally". He says his side and the media
"just operated on completely different mind-sets". A bit unfairly (but not too much) he
says that "[t]heirs was a mixture of 'It doesn't matter much who wins or loses as long as
we report it fairly and as, in our judgement, we see it.' There was also, on the editorial
side, a bit of 'As long as we can sell it better than our competitors'. My mind-set was:
'Say and do whatever you have to win.' This is euphemistically worded these days as 'Be
economical with the truth.' Hardly surprising, then, that we started so far apart."
It is, nevertheless, gratifying that he immediately follows this up: "And therefore
amazing, perhaps, how quickly we all adjusted in the following few weeks. Perhaps this
sort of attitude is another of those naval traditions we must make some compromises
12
13
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Summers: On Strategy II, p. 224.
Ibid., pp. 224-225.
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on.,,14 A prime example of the necessary adjustment to the information revolution of the
late 20th century.
The shoe in this war could, however, also be on the other foot. Martin Middlebrook
writes about the 'confidential' leaks by the military to the media about the compqsition of
the task force: "The Ministry of Defence deception operation was working well. A well-
known national newspaper published a list of ships believed to be with the task force; this
contained all the ships actually in the force but also named seven others which were
not!,,15
In other words, false information was purposefully leaked to the media for
dissemination to the enemy. In war, when all's fair, this is only to be expected. But then
one should not actually blame the press for reporting the news.
Who actually got the better of the conflict between the media and the military in the
Falklands, is an interesting question to ponder on. What is clear, is that both sides learnt
fast.
Next on the list was the American invasion of Grenada, which became a media
fiasco. In spite of this being the first fairly major operation being undertaken by the
American military after the Vietnam War, journalists, even American ones, were almost
totally barred from the scene. This soured military-media relations, which had just been
on the mend, even further. This operation did, however, have the advantage of a major
enquiry by the US military into its handling of the media, and a better understanding of
how to do things. 16
Things, therefore, went much better in the Gulf War, although the individual
commanders still had to learn how to handle the media.
In his memoirs, General Norman Schwarzkopf recounts how he framed three rules for
himself in his handling ofjoumalists at the beginning of the conflict:
* "Don't let them intimidate you. You know a hell of a lot more about what's
going on than they do."
* "There's no law that says you have to answer all their questions."
* "Don't answer any question that in your judgement would help the enemy."
But, he continues, "[s]uddenly it struck me that all three rules were negative in
nature. 'Wait a minute, Schwarzkopf,' I thought, 'before you get carried away, think back
to the lessons of the past. Think back to what caused the disenchantment of the American
public with Vietnam: they felt that they were constantly being misled with false body
counts and optimistic talk about the light at the end of the tunnel.' So I added rule number
four, the most important of all: 'Don't ever lie to the American people.' "
Schwarzkopf relates that he would truthfully say "I don't know" when this was the
case. Most importantly, he goes on: "I also understood that any attempt to cover up bad
news would lead to disaster.,,17
14
",.
17
Admiral Sandy Woodward: One Hundred Days. The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group
Commander (London, 1992), pp. 112-113.
Martin Middlebrook: Task Force: The Falklands War, 1982 (Middlesex, 1987), p. 74.
Summers: On Strategy II, p. 225.
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf: It Doesn't Take. a Hero, the Autobiography (New York, 1993),
p.399.
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In other words, Schwarzkopf understood the need for truthfulness and transparency
in the modern age - obviously without compromising tactical and operational surprise on
the battlefield.
These words were echoed by Lieutenant-General Sir Peter de la Billiere,
commander of the British forces in the operational theatre. In his memoirs he describe(j
his approach thus: "Another urgent preoccupation of mine was with the media. In the
Falklands I had learned to appreciate the power of the media and the influence they can
exert, for good or ill. I had found, first, that if I could win reporters on to my side they
could do a lot for the forces, and second, that if I put over a consistent message, that
message would start to filter into the hearts and minds of people in the United Kingdom.
Further, that message would permeate through to every level of British society, because if
one influenced the people of Britain, one began to influence politicians as well - and
support across the whole political spectrum was essential for the kind of major overseas
operation which we were mounting."
"The media, in other words, were of crucial importance, especially with modern
communications, which ensure that news is back in the United Kingdom almost before it
has happened. It seemed to me vital that ... war should be reported properly and not from
second-hand information; so in the Gulf I took a lot of trouble to bring the media
alongside and gave them every possible facility.,,18
Which, of course, did not mean that everything went entirely smoothly. Reports that
Brigadier Patrick Cordingley (later Major-General), commander of the 7th Armoured
Brigade, the famed Desert Rats, had said at a press conference that the British public had
to prepare themselves for a blood bath in the Gulf War led to a furore in the British Army,
and threatened to sour relations with the media.19
This incident is dealt with in detail in General Cordingley's book about his
experiences in the Gulf War.20 In hindsight, based on his account, it seems that the
problem was due to a combination of some naIve remarks by Cordingley himself and one
of his officers (probably because he did not understand the journalists' culture in a free
society), and downright bad, sensasionalist reporting by certain individual reporters -
which were, therefore, wrongly followed up by other media. In fact, Cordingley
acknowledges that some reporters agreed in his presence that he had been badly treated.
All this, however, formed part of the learning curve and will, in the longer term,
most probably be a positive experience.
Nevertheless, when the Kosovo War started, all the lessons, it seems, had been
forgotten, Right from the beginning two problems plagued relations with the media.
Firstly, that there was no co-ordination between press spokespersons at the Pentagon and
at NATO headquarters in Brussels, with the result that differing and even conflicting
pictures of the war were painted. Secondly, against the background of the politicians'
gross miscalculation that president Siobodan Milosevic would cave in after two or three
days of light bombardments, the spokespersons stayed very tight-lipped and gave out only
the most basic information, and even then got some things patently wrong.
18
19
20
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1992), pp. 63-64.
Brigadier Patrick Cordingley: In the Eye of the Storm, Commanding the Desert Rats in the Gulf War
(London, 1996), pp. 112-118.
Ibid, p. 114.
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As Jason DeParle of the New, York Times reported from Washington at the
beginning of April 1999: "In briefings at the Pentagon and at NATO headquarters in
Brussels, senior officials have refused to say exactly how many attack missions have been
launched; how many ofthose missions have been completed despite the bad weather; how
many bombs have been dropped; or what, precisely, the bombs have hit Such statistical
summaries were provided on a near-daily basis in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, even under
an information policy then criticized by journalists as overly restrictive."
He also quotes former Marine, General Richard Neal, who conducted the daily
briefings in Ryandh during the Gulf War, and is now a military analyst for CNN: "We're
not getting anything from those folks. There's a concerted effort at withholding
information, or maybe I shouldn't say withholding it - just not providing it" 2\
The previous day, the New York Times editorialised: "When democracies send their
military forces into combat, citizens need to know as much about the battles as sensible
security precautions permit In the case of Kosovo, with western reporters barred by
Serbia from covering the conflict on the ground, NATO and the Pentagon must provide a
detailed account of the effectiveness of the air war. It is a responsibility they have so far
failed to meet ... In the weeks ahead, President Clinton may seek public support for
escalating the air war ... Complicated political and security issues will have to be
resolved before the conflict ends. It is essential that citizens have all the information they
need to make informed judgments as these matters arise. Mr. Clinton and his counterparts
in Europe do themselves and their countries a disservice by so tightly controlling
information about the battle in KoSOVO.,,22
It is therefore gratifying that the criticising died down after a week or two. The
media being what they are, frequently like to criticise, but when things start to go right,
they are not as ready to give credit Nevertheless, it seems that NATO finally got it right,
and the fairly good relations between the media and the military were, therefore, restored.
The South African situation
In the old South Africa, things like democracy, political tolerance and press
freedom were not the highest priority of the opposing role players on the political field.
The drastic polarisation in the country meant that the quest for democracy in practice took
a back seat to the contest for political power.
This was aided by a Westminster-type constitution according to which Parliament
was sovereign. That meant that whoever formed the majority in the House of Assembly-
and after 1948 this was only the National Party - could, within the constraints of
practicality in the short term, do exactly as they pleased. Given the cut-throat character of
the contest for power, press freedom and freedom of speech was eroded to a large extent
This' also permeated the relations between the military and the media.
According to the Defence Act of 1957, as amended several times, the media was not
allowed to report anything about the SADF which was not given out by the military
themselves or expressly sanctioned by them. This did not merely apply to ongoing
operations, but to everything. It gave the military carte blanche for the manipulation of
news.
21
22
Jason DeParle: "Allies' progress remains unclear as few details are made public" (New York Times, 5
April 1999.
Ibid .• 4 April 1999.
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In contrast to the American or British military, who were fully exposed to the social
revolution regarding a sceptic public and the concomitant need for more communication
and openness, the SADF was thus artificially shielded from a necessary experience,
which meant that they were ill-equipped to withstand the relentless onslaught of the
rapidly changing social-political context within which modem military forces have to
operate and survive.
Thus, when South African forces were operating deep inside Angola during
Operation SAVANN AH in 1975-76, the previous govemment - and the SAD F - were
lying through their teeth to the South African public by denying any South African
involvement in the Angolan conflict.23
This was a scandalous breach of contract between the government and the voters
who had entrusted it with power, and between the military and the people whom they
were supposed to protect.
During all the cross-border operations which followed, from the attack on the
SWAPO base at Cassinga in 1978 to the final phase in Angola in 1987-88, the South
African public became ever more weary and sceptic of the strictly controlled and one-
sided information that came from official sources. Frequently the wildest rumours were
bandied about.
Small wonder, then, that even government-supporting newspapers such as Die
Burger protested against the counter-productive secrecy surrounding cross-border
operations in Angola. As the newspaper wrote after the initial reports regarding South
African involvement against the FPL offensive of 1987 (which evolved into Operation
MODULER): "Dit maak nie sin dat buitelandse nuusmedia deur middel van vreemde
nuus-agentskappe oorsee publisiteit gee aan ons betrokkenheid in Angola, terwyl die
mense vir wie dit die belangrikste is - die ouers van die seuns wat daar veg en die publiek
wat dit finansier en moreel steun - nie bevredigend deur hul eie plaaslike nuusmedia
ingelig kan word nie.,,24
The government had its reasons for staying silent. It did not want to be seen to be
involved in a war that was essentially a civil war in another country - perhaps
understandable, but naIve in the extreme if one takes into account that an entire South
African brigade was involved. But that also meant that the public support necessary to
sustain a war effort was not sought, just as the American government neglected to do in
Vietnam. The shortage of facts given out by the military in the name of security further
meant that the enemy was able to win the propaganda war time and again. Propaganda
and public relations have become, in the new world, essential parts of strategy and
operations, and, therefore, of winning wars. As Harry G. Summers aptly writes, "To the
degree that it jeopardises public support, total security may be worse than no security at
all.,,25
In other words, the SADF tied their one hand, so to speak, behind their back to face
an opponent who was able to use not only both hands, but his feet and teeth as well. What
was made public, was perceived by a large segment of the South African public to be
propaganda, and therefore untrustworthy. In contrast, the Cubans flew in reporters from
23
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several international news media to see for themselves what was going on. Importantly,
they did not try to influence these reporters overtly; they let them report freely what they
saw. But the reports were, of course, all from the Cuban side and about the Cuban
perspective.26 By default then, the SADF and the government lost the information war
hands down.
True, there were some relatively sophisticated attempts at media manipulation. A
system of military correspondents for the various media was introduced, and the
Conference of Editors, an informal grouping of newspaper editors, was sometimes briefed
in confidence about what was going on. However, the flow of information was too strictly
controlled. This meant that the media to a large extent lost their independence, and
therefore also their credibility.
The disregard by the SADF and the old government for the growing importance of
this aspect of strategy should be studied closely by the new SANDF, for it is a classic
example of how to do things incorrectly. It is also important for the SANDF, as there are
signs that the new government may slowly but surely be sliding down the same path.
This notwithstanding, the way in which the Defence Review was handled was very
good. Right from the beginning it was an open and transparent process in which the
public was continuously informed by way of media reports and public conferences. Even
more importantly, all sectors of civil society were drawn into making contributions about
how the country's defence should be structured. Even though the government and the
SANDF in the end largely made its own decisions, this was a good example of how to do
things.
Operation BOLEAS
Alas, the good work done with the Defence Review was to a great extent undone
with the South African military intervention in Lesotho in September 1998. Seldom has
there been a military operation where the communication and media liaison weaknesses
of the South African government and military have been so cruelly exposed.
The purpose of this intervention, as explained by Interior Minister Mangosuthu
Buthelezi - who, as acting president at the time, made the actual political decision - was
"to quash a military coup which would have prevented the people of Lesotho from
democratically resolving the conflict dividing the majority and its opposition". Elsewhere
the minister stated that "[iJt was not the SADC's intention to interfere in the internal
political and constitutional dynamics of Lesotho, but we intervened to ensure such
dynamics could freely express themselves as the people of Lesotho best wish, without
being silenced by the tyranny of a military coup.,,27 The mission the SANDF received
from the government was "to intervene militarily in Lesotho to prevent any further
anarchy and to create a stable environment for the restoration of law and order ... ,,28
This only came out well afterwards. From a public relation's point of view, the
operation itself was a disaster, although strenuous attempts were later made by the
SANDF to repair the damage. Things actually started going wrong at the national
strategic level: the Government had no discernable consistent security policy for Southern
Africa, lurching between the promotion of peace and support for military intervention
2.
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elsewhere on the one hand, as well as between support for democratic governments and
dictatorships alike on the other. This basic flaw brought about almost all the other
troubles that beset BOLEAS from its inception.
As Lieutenant-General Deon Ferreira, Chief of Staff: Joint Operations, explained a
few weeks afterwards to the Parliamentary Defence Committee and Portfolio Committee
on Foreign Affairs, the absence of a clear national security policy meant that the decision
to intervene in Lesotho thus came as a surprise to the SANDF itself as well. This meant
that there was too little time to plan and prepare, which in its turn meant that there was no
combat intelligence about how the mutineering soldiers of the Lesotho Defence Force
would react, and therefore the initial intervention force of 600 men was far too small.
More importantly, General Ferreira stated, there had been an absence of strategical
guidelines for media liaison, which thus became reactive in nature. In fact, he says,
communication - not media liaison - gave information to the media, which was not in
accordance with the provisions of the Standard Operating Forces Agreement between
South Africa and Botswana. His final conclusion was that the psychological and media
war had been lost at all levels, especially the strategic level.29
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Aziz Pahad admitted at the same briefing that
the government's lack of a clear media strategy had fuelled criticism of the operation. He
said few communications were issued during or immediately after the intervention and, as
a result, the country was kept in the dark about the motives for and objectives of the
operation.3o
Because of the inadequate time available, all effort went into operational planning
of the operation itself. The SANDF's media liaison office was not included in the
planning. Therefore, journalists woke up on the morning of Tuesday, 20 September 1998,
just as ignorant and unprepared for the event as the rest of the South African and Lesotho
population. Newsmen and -women rushed to the scene of the initial battles on their own,
and negligible military effort was given to help the journalists on the ground with their
task. Information such as was officially given out, came from DHQ in Pretoria. There
were even instances of journalists coming under heavy fire from the LDF mutineers, and
the SANDF refusing to bring them to safety. The officer in charge of communication of
the operation, Major Ben van Zyl, merely said, according to news reports, that it was not
the soldiers' duty to go and look for journalists "nadat ons aan hulle gese het dis op hul
eie verantwoordelikheid dat hulle Lesotho binnegaan nie".3i
Now contrast this with the attitude expressed by commanders such as Admiral Woodward
or General Schwarzkopf, and the full ineptness of the SANDFs media liaison during the
first days of BOLEAS becomes clear. To be sure, after a few days this changed
considerably. Journalists were flown in from South Africa and given full exposure to
what was happening. Writing in Beeld, Sekola Sello stated: "Lede van die gesamentlike
Suid-Afrika/ Botswana-mag soos It.kol. Jome Jordaan en die oorhoofse bevelvoerder van
die operasie, kol. Robbie Hartslief, was inderdaad baie behulpsaam teenoor die &'1'oot
groep Suid-Afrikaanse en buitelandse mediamense in Lesotho ... dit [was] inderdaad 'n
welkome en merkwaardige verandering om die Suid-Afrikaanse Leer so inskiklik te
vind.,,32
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The same must apply to the above-mentioned briefing General Ferreira gave to two
parliamentary committees, in which he ,impressed journalists with his total honesty and
transparency about what went wrong with the operation.
Which makes it all the more sad that the governing politicians could not bring
themselves to a similar attempt at honesty. "Maar in die tipiese styl van Suid-Afrikaanse
politici is dit diegene wat die slegte nuus gebring het" - in other words, the media - "wat
tot skurk gemaak word," writes Sello.33 At the same briefing where Ferreira appeared,
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad, called criticism of Boleas "bordering on
treason or criminality", while his colleague of Defence, Ronnie Kasrils, even suggested
that the media were actually lying when reporting that Maseru's central business district
had been razed - and this when TV bulletin after TV bulletin showed a gutted and
destructed city centre.34 Clearly a case of the messenger bearing the bad news being shot
because the people in question take badly to media criticism.
All in all, from a media liaison point of view Operation BOLEAS did not go well at
all. For this, the Government and its feeble attempts at damage control must bear the
brunt of the responsibility. The SANDF itself began very badly as well, but ended up with
considerable credit.
Lessons
Clausewitz wrote about the 'remarkable trinity' between the people, the army and
the government. "The passions that are to be kindled in war," he wrote, "must already be
inherent in the people ...,,35In other words, no war effort can be sustained for any period
of time without the support of the people.
Why is this? Clausewitz also contends that "[sJince war is controlled by its political
object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in
magnitude and also in duration.,,36 In the past, the value of the political object, and
therefore also the sacrifices, were determined by governments, and this is, of course, still
the case to a great extent. But in a democratic and open society, where the government is
accountable to the voters (who may reject it at the polling booth) and where the people
follow the doings of their elected rulers critically, it is, in the final analysis, the people
who have to be convinced that the value of the political object of the war is great enough
for the expected sacrifices that the war might entail.
l.S. Kotze makes the point very explicitly: "Die openbare mening is bepalend vir
die intensiteit waarmee nasionale belange beskerm moet word en die koste en die risiko's
wat in die verband aangegaan kan word. Militere operasies wat nie openbare steun geniet
nie", het dikwels rampspoedige politi eke gevolge vir die regering en veroorsaak 'n groot
verleentheid vir die gewapende magte.,,37
And for this, communication - stronger even, credible communication - is needed.
The hard fact is that no government in a modem, democratic and open society is trusted
enough any more to simply accept its word on face value. One of the biggest challenges
facing any democratic government in the world today is, therefore, to get the media on its
JJ
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side. For a news medium to be known to be manipulated by government (or anybody
else) is to kill its credibility and therefore the efficacy of its message.
The experience of commanders in the Falklands, the Gulf, Kosovo and Lesotho
related above attest to the fact that no strategist in a democratic society can reckon
without the media any more. As also related above, the relationship can be a very prickly
one, simply because the media has its own culture and way of doing things, and because
the media is interested in opening things up, while a commander faced with an imminent
operation might not want to disclose too much.
Nevertheless, the military and the media are, for better or for worse, condemned to
each other, and they will simply have to learn to understand each other better, although
they will never have an easy relationship as long as the press remain free.
As a media man, I would, therefore, like to end this paper by making some practical
suggestions to both sides to ease the relations as much as possible:
* Make a point of studying the way the other side thinks and works. Expose
yourself to their culture, or alternatively, appoint someone on your staff to do
so - and then listen to his of her recommendations when they are made.
Organize think tanks from time to time with representatives from both sides,
where problems that may have arisen as well as the relations in general may
be addressed. In this respect, the SANDF could do well to rethink its media
liaison strategy. In the past, there was a system of military correspondents and
even editors being confidentially informed about events. Although this, more
often than not, was intended to manipulate the media, the basic idea remains a
good one and could fruitfully be resuscitated.
The media should ensure that at least one reporter on its staff has an adequate
working knowledge of the military. Bad reporting happens too frequently
because the reporter does not understand what he is dealing with.
Dealing with the media and communications skills should become part and
parcel of all officers' training courses. Officers should be made aware of the
different levels of talking to the media - on the record, off the record and non-
attributable - and they should learn how to mind their P's and Q's when
speaking on the record. This applies not only to initial training courses, but
also to staff courses, and even right at the top. Like everything else, dealing
with the media in the new social and political circumstances doesn't come
automatically; it has to be learnt.
Officers should get to know their counterparts in the media and try to build a
relationship of trust with them. They must open to them as far as is
professionally possible, take them into their confidence. If the military does
not want a story published yet, they will have to convince the media why this
is so. That way, exceptions notwithstanding, the trust will mostly be
reciprocated. Not always because of the high moral standard of the journalist,
but because any good journalist knows that keeping confidences is in his own
interest. Publishing information that was given with the understanding that it
would be kept confidential is the surest way of never getting a good story ever
again.
* The military must accept and respect the independence of the media. Respect
the intelligence of (most of) the journalists. Experienced journalists have often
developed antennae for smokescreens. Be truthful, do not try to mislead them.
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Once the media get the impression that this is what you are doing, they will
tend to question even your truthful statements.
The military should make a distinction between individual journalists. If one
fails (and at one time or another, it probably will happen), it doesn't mean that
all media people are bad. There are good and bad apples amongst the media,
just as amongst soldiers.
The military should accept the new information age as a given. It is
counterproductive to resist it. Handling the media well has become an integral
part of doing the job as a soldier well.
In the final analysis, the military and the media should understand that while
they are adversaries, they are also allies - albeit independent ones, each with
their own agenda. Both should learn to handle this difficult relationship.
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